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23 November 2000 (Introduction updated 27 November 2001)

The Military Absentee Vote

Introduction

In light of controversy about ballot standards in the 2000 election some history is instructive. The destructive insistence on "states' rights" in this vital area has long hindered the citizen, even the citizen soldier, in exercising one of the most fundamental rights of citizenship. The abysmal ignorance of this history is illustrated by a letter to the editor of the Washington Post (incidentally a day after I'd done the original page and picked the background based on Kerr Eby's Ebb Tide, Tarawa). A writer chastises columnist Richard Cohen for defending the "old folks" in Florida and accuses the Democrats of anti-military action. He asks "What if this had been done to dear old Uncle Mike, knee-deep in gore and grenade pins at Tarawa?" "Uncle Mike" probably was never given any realistic chance to cast an absentee ballot. The soldier in 1944, as one will see here, was most likely effectively kept from voting at all.

My son-in-law, Ted Penton, became interested in the 1944 "Soldier Vote" issue after I mentioned running across it as I was searching microfilmed news papers and magazines for evidence of the very effective pre invasion cover and deception efforts in the weeks just prior to 6 June 1944. While scanning news pages for the months leading up to D-Day I was struck by another issue. Selfish politicians at home were fighting all reasonable proposals to enable the men then fighting or waiting to fight around the world a vote in elections as managed by 48 states with antiquated or highly restrictive rules.

At a time when critical war materials fought for space, even letters to and from soldiers were microfilmed as V-mail to save space and weight, politicians fought for shipping literally tons of cumbersome state ballots on wildly differing schedules to the troops. The idea of a short fused turn around for an absentee ballot from a state to some remote island in the South Pacific is ludicrous. One can only think that deep down they had no real interest in "our boys" and only thought of their party and cultural interests. Northern Republicans were afraid the laboring class voters would go for Roosevelt and the New Deal. They were allied with Southern Democrats who were most afraid the poor whites -- and God forbid -- African Americans in those segregated ranks might be encouraged to vote.

The citizen soldiers of 1944 were expected to vote heavily for the man who had introduced the New Deal. After all, GI Joe of the time was likely to be a poor working man or rural white from the South. The African Americans were a minor factor because some of the same forces aligned against the "Soldier Vote" bill were also fighting their inclusion in the forces and bitterly opposing suggestions they actually be allowed to fight. It is an interesting reversal of our position today in which Republicans assume the volunteer forces are theirs.

Notice in particular the time of these debates -- as U.S. Troops prepared to go ashore upon two beaches in Normandy code named Omaha and Utah. Many would sacrifice themselves to preserve a right they were being denied. One they might never to have again.

We don't know the poll numbers for the troops. I doubt pollsters were making overseas calls to demographic representatives in foxholes, tents and even Quonset huts. One view of the citizen soldier is found in a letter to the Ship's Wake, newsletter of the USS Salt Lake City (CA-25):

"Our friend also mentioned the soldier vote, which we have all been hearing so much about lately. If that isn't the rawest political joke and farce I've ever heard of! I just have to laugh. Sure they want us to vote. Like heck they do. Someone back there is afraid we will all vote for the wrong man. Otherwise why didn't they revise the law that states we much register at home to vote? For proof, how many men on this ship alone were able to vote? I'll be[t] 5, not 10%, just because we were unable to register. See what I mean? Take me for instance, I've been home 4 days our of nearly 3 1/2 years and now I can't vote. Multiply that by millions and you can see someone is against us voting. And yet our friend said the people back home wanted us to have our say."

C. L. Maschinot, RT2c "C" Division
(Click for letter's full text)

My personal observation, in light of November 2000 furor, is the interesting parallel between these two groups of 1944 and the result of the Republican Party's Southern Strategy. In effect that strategy united these cultural groups and passed dominance of the party's right wing to former Democrats turned Republican. They still seem unduly interested in limiting registration, turnout and accurate counts for all citizens while wrapping themselves in the flag and embracing the serviceman.

Perhaps it is ingrained. As late as 1999 the Republican Congressional leadership buried the Military Voting Rights Act by the classic method of referral to committee. There their chair could quietly see it never came to vote. A year later they wrap themselves in the flag of the military absentee vote they have worked so long and hard to discourage by entangling it in the bureaucratic tape of the states and even counties. Some Democrats may have been overly picky in trying to disqualify military absentee ballots on the assumption the voter was for the opposition this time, but the party making the big fuss has pretty dirty hands. They also lack consistency in applying "rules" by the "good for us, petty for them" standard.

My now dimming hope was that the November 2000 events would cause citizens to rise up and demand change in this ludicrous charade of 50 different systems multiplied by the number of counties in each. Citizens, whether in uniform or not, should not have their fundamental right to choose their leaders meddled with for the convenience of petty politicians. I also hope our Armed Forces avoid becoming more politicized. It is dangerous for both nation and the forces (remember the activist partisan Roman Legions and the result).

Ted did a fine job of summarizing this obscure bit of 1944 political skullduggery for a history paper that follows.

Ramon Jackson

[Background: Modification of art by Kerr Eby titled Ebb Tide, Tarawa in the Navy Art Collection. Description of this and others is on the Marines in Action page.]

Arming Soldiers with Ballots:
Allowing Service Members to Vote in the Presidential Elections of 1944
Ted Penton
November 1999

Background Information

Balloting service members during war has produced a great deal of debate in congress throughout United States History. The results of such debates settled little. There is a proposed bill on the floor of the House of Representatives this session faced by similar issues as past elections. The Presidential Elections of 1864 and 1944 both occurred with troops at a battlefront. Off-year federal elections, 1918 and 1942, also occurred with United States Servicemen engaged in hostilities. Debate over the rights of the soldiers to vote existed before and during each of these elections. No one ever questioned whether soldiers earned the privilege of voting, except possibly the Southern Democrats with regard to African-Americans. The question centered more on the matter of which party or presidential candidate soldiers may provide an advantage.

The Presidential campaign of 1864 pitted Abraham Lincoln, the Republican incumbent, against General George B. McClellan, a Democrat and former commander of the Army of the Potomac. The Democratic platform of peace emphasized the failures of the Army. The Republicans carried the vote of the soldiers many of whom received a furlough to go home for voting. Granting a furlough for soldiers to vote existed in the policies of the Union Army.¹ Other soldiers received their ballot in the field at makeshift polling stations.² It received little debate because both candidates thought they would secure the soldier vote through their personal involvement with the soldiers.

A bill to create federal election commission for the supervision of military voting failed to make it through congress in 1918. The opposition found a variety of reasons to contest the soldier's rights. Only twenty-eight thousand of the five million soldiers overseas in 1942 voted due to the inadequacy of state operated balloting.³ This led to the Green-Lucas Bill, proposed in December 1943, in order to create a War Ballot Commission for ensuring the soldier voting rights. In 1943 and 1944 the opposition consisted of Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats make separate arguments, but simply put they both feared the re-election of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The result of this debate produced few soldier ballots. This issue still resonates on the Senate floor today.

Representative Thomas F. Smith, Democrat New York, introduced the failed bill, which proposed a Federal Election Commission in 1918. Supervising military absentee voting provided the reason for establishing such a commission. The proposed bill invoked substantial debate in congress before its demise. Each state executed their own plan for conducting absentee balloting of service members. The failure to establish an apparatus for federal control of the balloting of soldiers and the inadequacy of the Soldiers and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 resulted in a low number of soldiers ballots in the federal election of 1942. The Soldiers and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 provided no requirement to insure that states allowed a person absent from a State as a result of military orders to not lose residence status in that State. This fact and the variety of voting laws in each state left many soldiers without the eligibility to cast their vote. One should remember poll taxes and other devices kept Blacks from voting in the South until 1964. The same devices often restricted or discouraged voting by poor whites.

In addition to the poll tax and literacy tests geared toward restricting certain groups, the voting age remained 21 until 1971 while the draft applied to 18 year olds. This age restriction resulted in a significant number of the lower ranking, non-career service members, the citizen soldier, having no voice in elections. This restriction failed to endure the Vietnam War and resulted in the "old enough to fight, old enough to vote" movement that pushed through legislation lowering the voting age to 18.

The Green-Lucas Bill

On December 3, 1943, the United States Senate passed a bill recommending that states take appropriate measures for polling their citizens currently engaged in military service. As the House of Representatives debated this states rights bill, the Senate engaged in debate over a rival bill, the Green-Lucas bill. Both bills sought a more effective means of balloting soldiers, especially service members whose home state had inadequate absentee balloting.

Using forty-eight different ballots created a variety of problems for the military directly related to the logistical demand of such a wide dispersion of troops. The size of a ballot containing every issue in the service members' district could become quite large and due to limited shipping space, affected whether or not service members received ballots. Further complicating the situation, many states held primary elections as late as September. This made the finalization of ballots for November difficult. The States Rights bill kept essentially the same inefficient system from the 1942 elections in place. Under this system a service member had to send a postcard home requesting a ballot in order to receive one. After verification of his eligibility, his local voting office sent the ballot via the mail.⁴ The forty-three states with such laws in place had mailed one hundred thirty-seven thousand ballots in 1942. As previously stated only twenty-eight thousand returned.

Bulky ballots proved unacceptable in a time of limited shipping capability that saw airmail and even surface mail restricted to ensure transport of critical war supplies. Some units, either in front lines or on remote islands, did not get mail on a routine, scheduled basis. Some improvements made such as V-mail (letters microfilmed before leaving the U.S. and restored to full size on arrival overseas) provided the majority of mail received. V-mail shows the absurdity of time limit, bulky state ballots. High officials in the military desired a smaller more standardized version.

Senator Theodore F. Green of Rhode Island and Senator Scott W. Lucas proposed a bill to eliminate these defects. Their proposal came from a proposed amendment to the 1942 law. The Green-Lucas Bill called for the establishment of a Federal War Ballot Commission to send and receive federal ballots to service members, Merchant Marines and government employed civilians overseas. The proposed ballots were for the election of President, Vice-President, and Congressmen only. Blank ballots going to the field as early as possible ensured enough time to retrieve the ballots and redistribute them to the state election officials. Service members would have the option of either selecting individual candidates or voting the party line. Once completed the ballot returned to the War Ballot Commission sealed in two envelopes.

The composition of this War Ballot Commission provided for two Democrats and two Republicans. An earlier idea of a fifth member for the purpose of tie breaking failed to gain the support of Supreme Court Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone. This proposition named Stone as a possible fifth member. He rejected the idea due to "political implications and political consequences." The proposal that this Committee have the power to reject electoral votes from states not participating also perished quickly. The Hayes-Tilden election of 1876, decided by a compromise in the Senate, provided adequate reason to reject such an idea. Representative Eugene Worley of Texas offered the companion bill in the House of Representatives. Worley's proposal differed from the Green-Lucas bill only in the fact that it called for service members to vote and not civilians or Merchant Marines. This idea of extending the ballot only to service members stood well with Republicans. ⁵

The Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, and the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, both professed their inability to deliver forty-eight different ballots and voting regulations to the eleven million service members serving worldwide. The idea of a standardized federal ballot appealed to Stimson and Knox even more than it did to the supporters of Roosevelt. Such a balloting system would allow them to claim success while efficiently ensuring service members the right to vote. Along with making recommendations, the Secretaries made it clear they could not support any particular voting legislation. A summary of Knox and Stimsons' position follows:

'The primary function of the Army and Navy [is] to wage war.' Therefore, they laid down some hard conditions if the services were to aid soldier balloting under state control. Some of them:

*State legislation should be uniform.

*Ballots should be mailed overseas at least 45 days before election.

*Both total weight and size of every ballot must be strictly limited (an enormous difficulty if all national and local elections are to be included; New York State's absentee ballot last year was a book of 900 pages.)⁶

The poor prospect of states adhering to such request did little to sway the opinion of Congressmen and Senators. These recommendations demonstrate a need for change. However, most congressmen, including many of those who supported the bill, questioned the constitutionality of such a ballot since voting regulations in the constitution are relegated to the states.

Although the Fifteenth Amendment (1870) provided Blacks with suffrage, southern states enacted legislation, which used such things as the poll tax and literacy test to prohibit Blacks from actually capitalizing on their right to vote. Poll taxes survived until the Twenty-fourth Amendment (1964). The Seventeenth Amendment (1913) changed the way Senators won their position to a popular vote instead of by their state legislatures. The Federal system distributes power between state government and national government. Few powers belong to only the national government according to the Constitution; taxation of imports and exports, bankruptcy and naturalization belong solely to the Federal government. Maintaining states rights dominated the views of many politicians. Even in cases where state measures prove to be inferior, legislatures often refuse to give in to federal control out of fear of setting precedent for further federal control to be established. However, the post Civil War Amendments particularly the Fourteenth, "Conclusively demonstrates no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and protections of the Bill of Rights" as Justice Hugo Black later stated in 1947.⁷

The Opposition

In addition to the constitutionality issue of the proposed Green-Lucas Bill, opposition arose from two different groups. The Southern Democrats feared the loss of their racist restriction of the Poll Tax and Literacy Test, which kept Blacks from voting throughout the South. The Northern Republicans simply feared the re-election of Roosevelt but discussed it as an issue of censorship of political material received overseas by service members. The most thorough explanation of the opposition's views comes from a brief biography of its most vocal critics and the comments they made during the debates on this issue.

Southern Democrats

The most vocal leader of the Southern Democrats; Representative John Elliot Rankin, Democrat Mississippi; stood "four- square against a federal ballot for soldiers, eight-square against the Administration and, of course, sixteen-square in favor of the poll tax, white supremacy, and Southern womanhood."⁸ Rankin served as the Dean of the Mississippi Delegations. Elected to the sixty-seventh Congress on November 2, 1920, he remained in Congress until 1953. Before the start of World War II Rankin co-authored the bill, that created the Tennessee Valley Authority, an indication of his support of Roosevelt and the New Deal. His congressional biography describes his military service as simply "an ex-soldier of the World War." He supported the service members by authoring legislation, which increased base pay for military personnel to fifty dollars a month. He also served as the chairman for the Committee on World War Veterans' Legislation. After the war, he would serve on the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. The core of Rankin's opposition lay in his steadfast belief that it was not constitutional.⁹ However, he stated he also believed the Communists were the primary drivers of the bill since the Daily Worker, a Communist run paper, heavily propagandized such legislation. A great deal of research on the Communists and their involvement in the United States shows they never achieved the type of power that enabled them to guide policy or law. However, the Communists desired to obtain suffrage for all Blacks in the United States. They called for an independent Black Republic for the Black Belt of the Southeastern United States. One plan for initiating such a new Republic called for its accomplishment through voting. Another actually called for armed insurrection.¹⁰ Both of these, however unrealistic they may appear, deeply threatened Southern politicians. Leading Southerners took every possible opportunity to attack the Communists and perpetuate fear of Black involvement with the Communists. Southern Democrats used such fear to retain a hold on power by suppressing the Black vote. The same measures used for such suppression also affected the voting of the poor uneducated Whites in the south.

Another Mississippi Congressman, Senator James Oliver Eastland, offered a bill to keep state control of polling service members. Eastland summarized the debated question when he stated "The sole issue. . . is whether we are to turn the election machinery of the country over to an aggregation of power-crazy bureaucrats in Washington."¹¹ His biographical data provided in the Congressional Directory shows his arrival to the Senate by appointment in June 1941. He served only three months of his appointment, but was elected outright in November 1942. No mention of the Senators military service appears in his biography.¹²

Senator Ellison DuRant Smith, Democrat South Carolina, first came to the Senate in 1908 when he was elected by the largest majority in South Carolina history up to that time. Known as Cotton Ed, he served as seniority over all Democratic Senators, and was a ranking member of the Naval Affairs Committee and the Privileges and Elections Committee. All of his positions in the Senate ensured his extensive involvement with the Soldier Vote issue. Enraged over comments made by Roosevelt, Cotton Ed Proclaimed "I am actually getting to the point where I turn to the Republicans when I want the real fundamental constitutional laws of this country adhered to."¹³ Smith also voiced concern that the federal government would try to lower the voting age to eighteen. Having the voting age remain at twenty-one allowed Southern Democrats, one more tool to limit and restrict the number of those who put them in power. There exists no mention of military service in Smith's biographical data.¹⁴

The Republicans

The Northern Republicans found Senator Robert A. Taft voicing the loudest concern against the Green-Lucas Bill. Taft joined the Senate after his November 8, 1938 election in Ohio. He earned degrees from both Harvard and Yale, but never involved himself with the military. Taft expressed no doubt that the administration controlled everything the service members read through the Office of War Information. The Office of War Information (OWI), formed in 1942, provided government propaganda throughout World War II. Taft claimed the censorship of the OWI ensured the service members would only receive anti-Republican political propaganda. However in the book Censorship and the Soldier Voting Law by John Jamieson the OWI exercised virtually no control on what the military read until after the voting bill existed as law;

Except for the enforcement of the Soldier Voting Law, there was almost no army-wide censorship for moral or political reasons and very little imposed at the post level. Title V of the Soldier Voting Law prohibited the distribution of "political propaganda" to the armed forces. A strict interpretation by the Adjutant General resulted in the suppression of many significant books and magazines. After much criticism in the press, the law received amendments to remove the unreasonable restrictions.

Taft also claimed that Roosevelt, as the Commander-in-Chief, would order service members to vote the Democratic ticket. He expressed the greatest agitation over remarks made by the President. Roosevelt called the States Rights measures a fraud. Immediately after Roosevelt's remarks were read Taft proclaimed them a "'direct insult' to Congress. ' This is a fourth term matter."¹⁵

Senator Rufus C. Holman, Republican Oregon, came to the Senate by election in 1938. A former schoolteacher he served as the State Treasurer for Oregon for the eight years immediately preceding his election. Holman stated simply "If he (Roosevelt) would eliminate himself . . . the debate on the pending bill would cease at once." Holman would lose his bid for re-election in the 1944 elections

As some Republicans decided to switch sides, Senator Joseph Hurst Ball, Republican Minnesota tied to induce a compromise. He offered an amendment to provide a federal ballot only in states that made no new arrangements for soldier balloting by June 1. This appears as a vague effort designed to save face. Ball's appointment to the Senate on October 14, 1940 resulted from the death of Senator Ernest Lundeens. In November 1943, Ball won his seat by election.

Analyzing the Opposition

Excluding Rankin, none of the Congressmen (whose opinions appeared in the newspapers and magazines of the day) opposed to the bill ever experienced military service. Many initially came to Congress through appointment. Their lack of military service leads to the conclusion that they possessed no clear concept of what servicemen experienced on a day to day basis. The battlefronts of World War II exceeded the size of anything our military ever experienced. The effort required in order to send a letter home far surpassed getting in an automobile and driving to the post office or simply handing it to the postman. Having received their position through appointment indicates that these individuals owed more to their party apparatus than to their constituents. Even if they won election since that appointment their original benefactors likely exhibited a good deal of influence on policy matters.

Supporters

The background of the bills supporters differs significantly from that of the opposition. Senator Theodore Francis Green, Democrat Rhode Island, one of the co-authors of the bill in question received a commission as a Lieutenant during the Spanish-American War. He commanded a provisional infantry company in the War. Green won election to the State House of Representatives in 1907. The people of Rhode Island elected him Governor in 1932 and re-elected him in 1934 by the largest vote ever cast in Rhode Island. Greens election to the Senate in 1936 and his re-election in 1942 showed him to possess a large support base at home.¹⁶

The responsibility for bringing the proposed bill to Capitol Hill fell to the other co-author, Senator Scott W. Lucas, Democrat Illinois. Lucas joined World War I as a private and received an honorable discharge as a Lieutenant at wars end. In 1920, he won his first political office of States Attorney for Mason County. He commanded the American Legions Department of Illinois in 1926 and then served as the Judge Advocate General for the Illinois National Guard as a Colonel in 1934. Lucas sought and won a Senate seat on November 8, 1938. He faced re-election in the coming elections of 1944. After the initial defeat of his bill, he offered a simpler version that reduced the War Ballot Commission to a simple collection agency.

"We are all stretching the rubber band of constitutional sufficiency in order to support the pending measure," stated Senator Millard E. Tydings, Democrat Maryland.¹⁷ Tydings served in World War I from April 6, 1917 to June 1, 1919. He rose from enlisted to Lieutenant Colonel receiving citations from Generals Pershing and Morton along the way. The Distinguished Service Medal and the Distinguished Service Cross, the nations second highest award for valor, make it certain his thoughts in the debate centered on the brave men fighting in the War. Tydings political career started in the Maryland House of Delegates. His election to the Sixty-eighth and Sixty-ninth Congress preceded his election to the Senate in 1926. In the election of 1944, he faced re-election for the third time.¹⁸

Senator Dennis Chavez, Democrat New Mexico, told his fellow Senators "We seem to be afraid."¹⁹ Chavez listed no military service in his congressional biography. However, his son was serving as a Lieutenant in the Marine Corps and his son-in-law as a Captain in the Army Air Corp. Unlike most of his allies in the campaign for the Green-Lucas bill, Chavez received an appointment to his first term as Senator on May 11, 1935. He won election in 1936 and re-election in 1942.

The author of the companion bill in the House of Representatives, Eugene Worley, served six years in the Texas Legislature before serving in the Navy as a Lieutenant Commander from December 1941 until August 1942. He participated in both the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars as a member of both organizations.²⁰ Worley's version of the bill excluded both the Merchant Marines and government employed civilians from utilizing the proposed War Ballot Commission. The Republican House Leader, Joe Martin, lent some support early on by stating a need existed for some federal assistance.

Another early convert to the bill defied his allegiance to the Southern Democrats. Senator Tom Stewart, Democrat Tennessee, received his position as an appointment. In addition, his lack of military service goes against the trend of his peers. Stewart appears an unlikely person to lead the switch to support.

Reactions in the States

Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey already possessed absentee voting; many other states pursued new legislation to enable their service members to vote. Others reverted to old but unused measures. In Georgia, Governor Ellis Arnall pushed a pro-service member bill through the state legislature. Months before, through the eighth amendment to the Georgia Constitution, Arnall already lowered the voting age to eighteen.²¹ West Virginia also enacted special legislation dealing with service member voting. Arkansas took perhaps the most dramatic step for a Southern state restoring a 1923 law abolishing the poll tax for soldiers. Special sessions occurred in January as the state legislatures of Connecticut, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan and Wisconsin all debated service member-voting laws. The Governor of New Jersey, Charles Edison suggested the states mail postcards to service members as opposed to requirement of the service member requesting a ballot. The new laws initiated by state governments produced no major gains toward uniformity.²² Regardless of state voting regulations, the United States Congress still faced the problem of issuing and collecting ballots. Compromise appeared as the only hope for a workable solution.

Service Members Speak

Attitudes of service members show as wide a variety of opinions as those expressed by their congressional representatives. A naval officer in the Pacific wrote a letter to Newsweek in which he stated the majority of Sailors on his cruiser showed little interest in voting. However, many planned to run for office themselves upon their return. This prompted the officer to write "I am certain that no one but a veteran--probably those who have seen active service--will hold any job after the war, from Constable to President." Conversely, Representative Worley claimed to have questioned enlisted men in Union Station all of whom reportedly desired to vote. Worley also boasted that some of his friends had questioned service members in North Africa with the results being that sixty out of seventy-one were anxious to vote. The opinion of a wife writing to her spouse seems to support Worley's findings. In a letter dated June 6, 1944, she stated "Mr. Duffy, the Democratic precinct captain was just here for your address, which I gave him. I hope he'll be able to facilitate voting for the man in this precinct. The soldier's vote bill as it now stands is one of the lousiest deals in our political history."²³ (Jill to Al June 6, 1944 B) She clearly displays a bias toward the Democrats and Roosevelt however. In the same letter she refers to Roosevelt as "that wonderful man."

Compromises and Revisions

Senator Lucas revised his original proposal to allow the Army and Navy to deliver the service members ballots directly to the states. He stood fast on the President, Vice-President and Congress remaining the only people on the federal ballot. Other concessions actually became amendments to the States Rights Bill, or Eastland Bill, as it was also known. The Eastland Bill had already received approval in the House and gained approval in the senate due to the relentless efforts of Senator Overton. Some of the amendments considered were:

1. The Danaher amendment, providing a Federal ballot for the overseas forces but limiting its home use to servicemen whose states had failed to set up adequate machinery.
2. The Taft amendment-sponsored by six Republicans and nine Southern Democrats (one of them Sen. James O. Eastland of Mississippi, sponsor the original states' rights bill)--limiting the Federal ballot both at home and abroad to absentee voters whose states failed to set up certain specified arrangements by June 1.²⁴

President Roosevelt made his opinion on the issue of polling the service member quite clear. "Speaking as 'Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces,' he bluntly termed the states' rights measure 'a fraud on the soldiers and sailors and marines . . . upon the American people.'"25 He challenged the members of congress to a roll call vote, which was not legally required, by saying "Stand up and be counted." Some of the comments made by congressmen have already received discussion. One important one has not. The "stand up and be counted" challenge became the anti-New Deal coalition rallying cry. After defeating a motion to replace the states' right measure with the Worley bill on a roll call vote, Minority Leader Joe Martin proudly stated "We're not afraid to be counted!" This victory for the anti-New Deal coalition came after the longest session since the beginning of the War. Representative Rankin held the bill as "The greatest victory for states' rights and constitutional government that has been won in this Capitol for 50 years!"26

Debating multiple pieces of legislation simultaneously often leads to wide-ranging, some times unexpected, compromises. The right of service members to vote, even with its extensive debate, fell victim to such a situation. Election year politics produce fertile ground for compromise especially as postwar planning such as mustering-out pay and unemployment pay already existed as proposals. These issues like the G. I. Bill of rights, enacted in 1943, were sometimes authored by and nearly always supported by the opponents of the voting bills. This suggests that some of the legislators opposing the federalizing of voting rights made their case simply on the constitutionality of such a measure and gave little or no concern toward the service members. The funding of the OWI prompted more debates on an already battered agency. The contempt case of Jonathan Daniels and an attempt to curb Presidentially created agencies reached their zeniths at nearly the same time as the Soldiers Vote Act. Daniels became one of six administrative assistants to Roosevelt in 1943. His appointment as American minister to New Zealand failed when Senator Bailey from his home state of North Carolina blocked it. Daniels was unpopular with many congressmen because he pursued equality for Blacks.27

The President Receives the Bill

The bill that reached the President resembled the original States' Rights measure more than the Green-Lucas Bill did. In order for a service member to obtain a Federal ballot he must comply with detailed instructions and possessed eligibility. The first step required the service member to apply for a state ballot before September 1, 1944. If the state ballot had not arrived by October 1, a likely event given the shipping constraints of the War, the service member received a Federal ballot. However, the state in which the service member qualified to vote in must first have passed legislation to authorize use of the shortened Federal ballot. Such legislation required ratification as law before July 15, 1944.

Roosevelt immediately called upon all forty-eight governors to inform him of their states' intention regarding the Federal ballot. Forty-three responded with seventeen stating that either state ballots had proven adequate or further legislation would not come before July 15. Eighteen other responses he received indicated that laws allowing the use of a Federal ballot were in place. The remaining eight responses were vague. Faced with three choices, let it become law without his signature, approve it, or veto it, Roosevelt chose the first. He confessed he still felt the bill was "wholly inadequate." At this time, Roosevelt still had not committed to a fourth term. Following the Soldier Vote bill becoming law, Roosevelt petitioned congress for $64,390,000 to sustain the OWI for another year.28

The Results

The votes of service members in the 1944 elections provided no significant effect on the national level as only eighty-five thousand Federal ballots went to overseas service members. Thomas E. Dewey (Republican Party) received 22,321,018 votes and 99 electoral votes. Three other presidential candidates split just over 200,000 votes. The Incumbent won with 25,606,585 votes and 432 electoral votes.29 These statistics show that he won by 3,285,567 votes. In order for the service members to have made an impact in the 1944 election, the entire eleven million would have to have voted. Seventy percent would have had to vote for Dewey to change the election results.

The 1942 congressional elections produced a ten-seat increase for Republicans in the Senate leaving them still the minority with thirty-eight. In the House, they gained forty-seven seats closing to within eleven of equality with the Democrats. With the Southern Democrats, leaning away from the administration the anti-New Deal coalition easily exhibited the majority in both the Senate and the House. The 1944 elections left the Senate with the same party composition, while House Republicans lost nineteen seats. The anti-New Deal coalition would remain in power.30

Resonance

The issue continues to spark debate today. Difficulties with the various state requirements still exist despite vastly improved transportation and communication. The percentage of service members voting is greater than the percentage of civilians casting ballots. Many of the old state restrictions were overcome in the civil rights era. Time limits and procedures remain as the main barrier. Local officials still question the residency of military voters. However, efforts to provide national guidance still face the old arguments.

According to an article written by a United States Army Staff Sergeant for the American Forces Press Service, " More than 2.8 million military personnel and family members have the right to vote. The DOD Federal Voting Assistance Program provides them tools and help to exercise this right regardless of where they are stationed." The 1986 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act provided sixty-four percent of all service members with a ballot in the 1996 elections. Service members have access to every states absentee procedure via an online catalog and receive further information from voting assistance officers. Service members may request and receive their ballots by fax in forty-four states. A plan to allow service members to vote by e-mail may get a test run in the elections of 2000. This plan's development results from the success of fax balloting according to Polly Brunelli, the Director of the Department of Defense (DOD) Federal Voting Assistance Program.31

Representative Henry Bonilla, Republican Texas, came to congress in 1992. Early in his third term, Bonilla introduced the Military Voting Rights Act of 1997 to the house. The bill's co-author Representative Sam Johnson, Republican Texas came to office in a special election due to the resignation of Representative Steve Bartlett in 1991. Johnson served in the Korean War and in Vietnam as a member of the United States Air Force. In 1966 he became a prisoner of war and remained so until 1973. The purpose of the bill is "To guarantee the right of all active duty military personnel, merchant mariners, and their dependents to vote in Federal, State, and local elections."³² (HR) This proposed Military Voting Rights Act consists of a series of amendments to both the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (SSCRA) and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). A new section proposed for Article VII of the SSCRA states

"SEC. 704. (a) For purposes of voting for an office of the United States or of a State, a person who is absent from a State in compliance with military or naval orders shall not, solely by reason of that absence--

`(1) be deemed to have lost a residence or domicile in that State;

`(2) be deemed to have acquired a residence or domicile in any other State; or

`(3) be deemed to have become resident in or a resident of any other State.

`(b) In this section, the term `State' includes a territory or possession of the United States, a political subdivision of a State, territory, or possession, and the District of Columbia.'." 33

The Amendment for the UOCAVA clarifies the language used to establish residency of service members by the states. It also establishes the right for service members to vote in all elections for State and local offices provided the ballot arrives at the appropriate election office at least thirty days prior to the election. The same bill became the Military Voting Rights Act of 1999 upon its reintroduction on August 3, 1999. On that same day the bill was referred to the Committee on House Administration, and in addition to the Committees on Veterans' Affairs, and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.³⁴

The last action taken on this bill as of December 9, 1999 saw it sent to the Subcommittee on the Constitution on August 9, 1999.

¹ Charles P. Roland, An American Iliad: The Story of the Civil War (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1991), 196.

² Readers Companion to American History, "Elections", ed. Eric Foner and John A. Garraty, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991) 338.

³ "Should Soldiers Have the Vote? They Say Yes Congress Maybe" The Nation, Newsweek (6 December 1943) : 54.

⁴ Newsweek (6 December 1943): 54.

⁵ Newsweek (6 December 1943): 54, 59.

⁶ G.I. Vote Snags, Newsweek (January 17, 1944) : 36.

⁷ Foner, "Bill of Rights", 98, 99.

⁸ "U.S. At War: The Congress," Time, 14 February 1944, Vol. XLIII, No. 7, 17.

⁹ Congressional Directory. 78^th Cong., 2d sess., June 1944

¹⁰ Wilson Record, The Negro and the Communist Party (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 61-68.

¹¹ "U.S. At War: The Congress," Time, 13 December 1943, Vol. XLII, No. 24, 18.

¹² Congressional Directory. 78^th Cong., 2d sess., June 1944

¹³ "Soldier-Vote Problem Complicated by Mechanics as Well as Politics" The Nation, Newsweek ( 14 February 1944) : 39.

¹⁴ Congressional Directory. 78^th Cong., 2d sess., June 1944

¹⁵ "How They'll Vote Is Real Issue Behind Soldier Ballot Dispute" The Nation, Newsweek ( 7 February 1944) : 46, 48.

¹⁶ Congressional Directory. 78^th Cong., 2d sess., June 1944

¹⁷ "U.S. At War: The Congress," Time, 13 December 1943, Vol. XLII, No. 24, 18.

¹⁸ Congressional Directory. 78^th Cong., 2d sess., June 1944

¹⁹ "U.S. At War: The Congress," Time, 13 December 1943, Vol. XLII, No. 24, 18.

²⁰ Congressional Directory. 78^th Cong., 2d sess., June 1944

²¹ Albert Berry Saye, A Constitutional History of Georgia 1732-1968, Revised Ed. (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1970) 387-392.

²² "U.S. At War: The Nation," Time, 17 January 1944, Vol. XLIII, No. 3, 17.

²³ War Correspondence of Jill Oppenheim de Grazia and Alfred de Grazia: Jill to Al June 6, 1944 B, JUNE 1944 A http ://www.grazian-archive.com/let44ja.htm

²⁴ "Soldier-Vote Problem Complicated by Mechanics as Well as Politics" The Nation, Newsweek ( 14 February 1944) : 36, 39.

²⁵ "How They'll Vote Is Real Issue Behind Soldier Ballot Dispute" The Nation, Newsweek ( 7 February 1944) : 46, 48.

²⁶ "Soldier-Vote Problem Complicated by Mechanics as Well as Politics" The Nation, Newsweek ( 14 February 1944) : 39.

²⁷ Jonathan Daniels Papers, "Biography" UNC (Ht tp:/ /cadmus.lib.unc.edumss/inv/d/Daniels,Jonathan. html)

²⁸ "U.S. At War: The Presidency," Time, 10 April 1944, Vol. XLIII, No. 15, 17.

²⁹ Election Results, http://www.sddt.com/features/convention/elections/1944.html

³⁰ Election Results, http ://www.sddt.com/features/convention/congress

³¹ Election Results, http: //www.ojc.org/NL/feb99/absentee.Html

³² HR 699 - Military Voting Rights Act August 3, 1999

³³ HR 699 - Military Voting Rights Act August 3, 1999

³⁴ HR 699 - Military Voting Rights Act August 3, 1999

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